Using a unique dataset of art auctions on eBay, we conduct an empirical analysis of the added value of an auction's charity status. The panel structure of our dataset allows us to employ …xed e¤ects techniques to control for observed and unobserved di¤erences across auctions. The existing literature suggests a quantitatively small impact of charity status on sale price. In contrast, our results point to a highly signi…cant, and sizable, impact of charity status on the behavior of buyers and sellers and on market outcomes. For a certain group of auctions in particular, charity status increases the second highest bid by 103%, on average, when compared with standard auctions, and the probability of sale by 55%. Charity status also has a signi…cant impact on the opening bid and the number of bidders participating in the auction. Interestingly, the ending date of the auction has an important impact on the outcome of the charity auction.
INTRODUCTION.
The …eld of philanthropy has received the attention of the economics profession for many years. Economists have applied all the available tools in economics to gain a better understanding of philanthropic behavior -from theoretical analysis to laboratory experiments, …eld experiments and econometric analysis. The most noteworthy economic research in the area over the last 25 years has been surveyed by one of the leading researchers in the …eld in Andreoni (2006) .
In this paper we undertake an empirical study of a unique philanthropic event on eBay.
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , many artists and other sellers on eBay began an unorganized e¤ort to collect funds for the families of the victims of the terrorist attacks by o¤ering all, or a portion, of the revenues from a number of their artworks for charity. In addition, in response to a request for help from the then-governor of New York, George Pataki, eBay launched a program to facilitate the placement of charity auctions. This program became active on September 17, 2001 and was labeled with the name "Auction for America."The original intent of the program was to collect one hundred million dollars for charity in one hundred days.
2 Auction for America reached its 100th day on December 25,
2001
. This philanthropic e¤ort received contributions from more than one hundred thousand eBay users and raised about ten million dollars. 3 We analyze a large panel of art auctions collected between July and December, 2001, as 2 Art was one of many products sold using the Auction for America program. For example, one of the items sold using this program was Jay Leno's celebrity-signed Harley Davidson .
3 Source: eBay press release http://www.csrwire.com/PressReleasePrint.php?id=873.
part of a research project whose purpose was to analyze buyer and seller behavior in online auctions. These data consist of art auctions from a group of artists who post their work for sale on eBay regularly. Our panel includes data from the Auction for America (AA) program as well as other charity (OC) auctions not part of the AA program.
A sub…eld of the broad area of economic research in philanthropy that is directly related to the analysis conducted in this paper is the study of auctions as a means of collecting revenue for charity. Recent economic research has contributed to a better understanding of the theoretical properties of di¤erent auction mechanisms as a way of collecting revenue from charity auctions (Engers and Goere, et al., 2005) . Given a standard theoretical setting, this research ranks di¤erent auction mechanisms according to their capacity to generate revenue. The theoretical analysis demonstrates that all-pay auctions generate the highest revenue, followed by second-price auctions, and …rst-price auctions are the worst performers. These results are broadly replicated in the experimental economics literature (Goeree and Schram, 2004; Davis et al., 2006) . However, these results are contrary to results observed in a recent …eld experiment (Carpenter, et al., 2008) which shows that the all-pay and second-price formats are dominated by the …rst-price auction. Their analysis points to di¤erential bidder participation across auction formats as the source of the discrepancy between the theory and the laboratory results, on the one hand, and the results from the …eld, on the other hand. While …eld experiments bring us one step closer to mimicing the outcomes of a real auction environment, they also present challenges. Researchers in the area of philanthropy have recognized the potential importance of the Internet as a medium for carrying out philanthropic events and charity auctions, in particular (e.g. Goeree, et al., 2005; Reis and Clohesy, 2000) . The Internet o¤ers a platform that a¤ords charity organizations the opportunity to reach a large audience at a minimal cost. Furthermore, charity organizations have access to already mature markets, like eBay, with established transactions mechanisms, which is not a small facet.
There are few studies that analyze the performance of charity auctions on these established markets. Chua and Berger (2006) conduct an exploratory study of the value of conducting charity auctions on the Internet. They compare the exchange prices of similar items on eBay's charity and standard auction sites. They …nd that selling prices are higher on the non-charity sites. Elfenbein and McManus (2007) focus their analysis on the useful-ness of charity auctions as marketing devices by for-pro…t …rms. They collect information on charity listings from 330 unique charities and also collect information on non-charity auctions for similar goods. For the group of successful (sold) auctions, they match charity auctions with non-charity auctions for similar products. This process yields a total of 723 charity auctions and an average of 2.4 non-charity auctions per match. Their results indicate that a 10% giving results in a 5% increase in price while 100% giving results in a 7% increase in price.
These two studies contribute to our understanding of charity auctions on the Internet.
However, additional work in this area is required in order to gain a better understanding of the e¤ects of charitable behavior in this important market for philanthropic work. Also, some potential problems with the methodology employed in these papers remain. In particular, it is quite common to have unsold items in eBay auctions; for example, 44% of regular auctions and 23% of charity auctions go unsold in our data. Their focus on sold items may generate endogenous selection. Moreover, we argue in this paper that the …nal auction price is the result of choices made by the seller (e.g., the opening bid), and the buyer (e.g., willingness
to pay) and that it makes sense to study these decisions separately. Furthermore, their focus on a large number of charities results in signi…cant unobserved heterogeneity across charities. Also, results in our paper suggest that buyers may have a tendency to select some charity auctions and avoid others. As a result, whether a charity auction collects more or less revenue than a comparable non-charity auction may depend on speci…c characteristics of the seller, the auction and the charity. In addition, there may be selection of sellers and charities at di¤erent levels of giving. Finally, the "Giving Works" charity program investigated by these authors has relatively complex rules, and Elfenbein and McManus (2007) report some evidence suggesting that potential buyers may not fully understand these rules at the time they place their bids.
In contrast with the …ndings of existing empirical research on charity auctions on eBay, our results point to a highly signi…cant, and sizable, impact of charity status on the behavior of buyers and sellers and on market outcomes. The ending date of the auction has an important impact on the outcome of the charity auction. In particular, the AA status of an auction posted in September 2001 increases the second highest bid by 103%, on average, when compared with standard auctions, and the probability of sale by 55%. For OA auctions, a 10% increase in the proportion of the pro…ts that go to charity results in an 8% increase in the second highest bid. The paper reports other signi…cant results for AA and OA auctions according to the date of placement of the auction after September 11. A more detailed summary of results is presented in the conclusions section.
In section 2, we describe in more detail the AA and OC auctions and the data to be used in the empirical analysis. In section 3 we present the empirical analysis and results. Section 4 concludes. Tables are presented at the end of paper.
2 The Market and the Data. The most popular artwork up for auction is paintings, but other types of artwork, like collages, ceramic tiles, or sculptures, are also common. In our analysis we use data on original paintings only. The sample includes auctions from 243 di¤erent artists, including, 5879 standard, or non-charity, auctions and 377 charity auctions from 96 di¤erent artists.
In addition, charity auctions are divided into two groups: 287 charity auctions associated to the AA program and 90 charity auctions organized by the artists independently of the AA program (see Table 1 ).
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For each auction, we collected information on object-speci…c characteristics, other auction characteristics and bidding history. We also collected information on artists'reputation using eBay's feedback rating measure. At the end of each transaction, the buyer and the seller have a chance to rate their level of satisfaction with the transaction (positive, neutral, negative).
We collect data on the type of feedback received by the seller in all previous transactions, which is readily available from eBay. However, because it is very unlikely for an artist in our sample to receive bad feedback, there is no real within sample variation in artists'feedback in our sample; thus, this variable is not included in the analysis. 6 Characteristics speci…c to the object being auctioned include information on the height, width, style (abstract, pop, whimsical, etc.), medium (acrylic, oil, etc.), and ground (stretch canvas, paper, wood, etc.).
Other auction characteristics include the opening bid, the shipping and handling fees, and the …nal number of bidders and selling price.
Several characteristics of these data make them unique. First, the data collected comprise all eBay market activity of a speci…c group of sellers for a long period of time while the data collected by most other researchers usually represent only a narrow snapshot of market activity. Second, by nature, the intrinsic value of artwork is uncertain, especially in the case of lesser-known artists. In contrast, much of the data collected by other researchers refers to items whose market value can be determined with accuracy, like coins, stamps, or computers, reducing the value of auctions as a selling, price-…nding mechanism. Finally, the panel structure of our dataset allows us to employ panel data techniques to measure the e¤ect of charity on di¤erent market outcomes while controlling for unobserved confounding factors.
B. The Market.
An auction on eBay includes a description of the item being auctioned, including pictures.
When posting a new auction, sellers can choose several auction characteristics (e.g., the opening bid). Buyers can browse through thousands of auctions posted every day. Auctions are organized by categories and subcategories, which simpli…es the buyer's search. Buyers can also use a powerful search engine and are also able to request additional information about an auction from the seller anonymously via e-mail. Potential buyers can participate in an active auction at any time over the duration of the auction by submitting a "proxy"
bid. This type of bidding works as follows: as long as a bidder's proxy bid is higher than the second highest bid, she will remain the highest bidder, at a price equal to the second highest bid plus a small increment. When a new bid is submitted, the auction's price is updated accordingly. Proxy bids can be revised (increased) at any time prior to the end of the auction. Only bids above the existing second highest bid, plus an increment, are accepted and recorded. Thus, the number of potential bidders is likely to be larger than the number of bidders recorded by eBay. The highest bidder at the end of the auction wins the item at a price equal to the second highest bid, plus a small increment.
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C. Descriptive Statistics.
In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics for our data. The table is divided into two parts; in the upper part we report descriptive statistics by charity status; in the lower part we report descriptive statistics for AA and OC auctions. The average painting for sale at a charity auction is about 24% smaller than that at a standard auction. Charity auctions have a much smaller opening bid, but a much higher sale price, than standard auctions -on average the prices are $58 for charity auctions vs. $38 for standard auctions. The sale price represents the …nal price paid by the winner of the auction, which in the case of standard auctions includes shipping and handling fees. Also, charity auctions attract a much larger number of bidders than standard auctions and have an average probability of sale of 77%, which is much higher than the 56% probability of sale of standard auctions. There are also 7 Additional information about eBay auctions can be found in Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) : signi…cant di¤erences between AA and OC auctions. Paintings for sale through the AA program are 21% smaller than painting sold in OC auctions. The fact that the artist is required to pay shipping costs in AA auctions may contribute to this di¤erence.
For both types of charity auctions, the sale price and the probability of sale was smaller for auctions listed later in the year, and the di¤erence was signi…cant. In particular, the average sale price for AA auctions was $76 in September but it had decreased to $35 by November, while the average probability of sale was 88% in September and 69% in November. Also, the average sale price for other charity auctions was $61 in September and $30 in October, while the average probability of sale was 60% in September and 41% in October. The average number of bidders also decreased noticeably over time.
3 Empirical Models and Estimation Results.
Our reduced form econometric analysis is guided by economic theory. The type of eBay auctions that we consider …t well within the framework of an independent private value, ascending-bid, second-price auction subject to some speci…c rules. The seller of the object being auctioned sets the opening bid, s 0 : Each potential bidder, k; assigns a value, v k ; to the object being auctioned. Bidders know and care only about their own valuation. Bids are submitted electronically. New bids arrive sequentially at any time during the length of the auction. The price of the auction at any point in time is set at the current second highest bid, and the current, or active, bidders are public information. Any new bid has to surpass the current second highest bid by a minimum increment in order to be recorded. 8 In this framework it is optimal for a bidder to bid her true valuation. Thus, consider an auction with M observed bids, fb k g M k=1 ; from K active bidders, with K N; and N representing the total number of potential bidders; that is, active bidders along with bidders who intended to bid but whose valuation was below the second highest bid at the time they intended to bid. Within this framework, we have three possible scenarios:
with v N 1 ; and v N ; representing the second highest, and the highest, valuation from the group of potential bidders. In order to understand the impact of a seller's reputation on this market it is important to di¤erentiate between the impact on the behavior of the seller and the buyer.
We always observe s 0 : In addition, when the opening bid is low enough we observe v N 1 = p; K 2; otherwise we observe s 0 . Note that s 0 is set by the seller while p, when K 2; is set by the bidders'willingness to pay. Sellers and bidders may have con ‡icting objectives. Thus, in our empirical analysis we will analyze s 0 and v N 1 separately. Because s 0 is always observed we can employ simple linear regression techniques in its analysis.
However, v N 1 is only observed when s 0 is low enough to attract at least two bidders; otherwise, s 0 represents an upper bound for v N 1 . Thus, in this second case we will employ censored regression techniques. In addition, we also study the impact of seller feedback on the probability of sale, the number of bidders, and the probability of future negative feedbacks.
Given the heterogeneous nature of the data employed in our analysis, we divide the data in groups along several di¤erent dimensions: artist, medium, and ground. More precisely, all paintings from a particular artist, using a particular medium (e.g. oil), on a particular ground (e.g., canvas) will be assigned to a group. This data segmentation skims along with the use of …xed e¤ects (FE) techniques allow us to identify the average e¤ect of explanatory variables from variation in the data within relatively homogeneous groups. The size of the artwork is a continuous measure and will be controlled for within the econometric model.
Our models also control for style; because artists can select up to three di¤erent styles per auction the total number of combinations is quite large making it impossible to incorporate this variable into the …xed e¤ects skim.
All econometric models considered share a common structure. The endogenous outcome of interest, y ij ; associated with auction i from group j is represented as a function of three components: observed exogenous explanatory variables, X ij ; a group-speci…c …xed e¤ect, j ; and a residual component, " ij ; representing random variation unobserved by the econometrician. Analytically, we consider models of the form
that are estimated using group-speci…c …xed e¤ect (FE) techniques appropriate for each speci…cation to control for potentially endogenous …xed e¤ects. The results from our econometric analysis are presented in Tables 2-5 and are discussed next.
A. Charity Auctions, the Number of Bidders, and the Probability of Sale.
The objective here is to analyze results from a reduced form speci…cation of the overall impact of an auction's charity status on the number of bidders participating in an auction.
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In Table 2 we present estimation results from four di¤erent …xed e¤ects log-linear regression models of the number of bidders, plus one, as a function of characteristics of the artwork being auctioned and the auction's charity status. The models di¤er on the level of aggregation, over time, of the impact of an auction's charity status on the number of bidders. All models have been estimated using a …xed-e¤ects strategy to control for artist-, medium-, and ground-speci…c e¤ects. All estimated models have signi…cant explanatory power, as indicated by R-square values around 0.55. Size is not an important determinant of the number of bidders. In contrast, the auction's charity status has a signi…cant and sizable e¤ect on the number of bidders across model speci…cations.
Model 1 includes controls for AA and OC status. We observe that AA status increases the number of bidders by 73% with respect to standard auctions, while OC status increases the number of bidders by 16%, on average. However, these aggregated measures conceal important di¤erences in bidders' arrival over time. In model 2 we attempt to understand the importance of the ending time of the auction by interacting charity status with months dummies according to the ending date of each particular auction. For AA, the number of bidders increases by 93% with respect to standard auctions in September, by 69% in October and by 42% and 49% in November and December. Thus, di¤erences in the number of bidders with respect to standard auctions are decreasing over time. This e¤ect is even more pronounced for OC status; the number of bidders increases by 49% with respect to standard auctions in September, but decreases by 23% in October, and no OC auctions are posted in the following months. In models 3 and 4 we analyze the impact of di¤erent levels of charity giving in OC auctions on the process of bidder arrival. Focusing our attention on the linear model, we observe that a 10% increase in the proportion of pro…ts that go to charity results in a 6% increase in the number of bidders.
Similarly, in Table 3 we present …xed e¤ects linear probability models for the probability of sale with the same speci…cations as these of Table 2 . The results suggest that size has a negative impact on the sale probability, but this e¤ect is small in magnitude. With regard to the impact of charity status, the results in model 1 suggest that AA status increases the probability of sale by 0.25, a 45% increase in probability with respect to the average probability of sale of standard auctions; also, OC status increases the probability of sale by only 0.01, and this e¤ect is not signi…cant.
In model 2 we attempt to capture the importance of the timing of placement of the auction by interacting charity status with month dummies according to the ending date of each particular auction. For AA, the sale probability increases by 0.31 with respect to standard auctions in September, and it increases by 0.23 in October and by 0.06 and 0.09 in November and December. For OC the probability of sale increases by 0.20 with respect to standard auctions in September, but decreases by 0.21 in October.
In models 3 and 4 we analyze the impact of di¤erent levels of charity giving in OC on the sale probability. Focusing our attention on the linear e¤ects model, we observe that a 10% increase in the proportion of revenues that go to charity results in a 2.2% increase in the probability of sale, although this e¤ect is not signi…cant at the usual level, perhaps in part as a result of the small number of OC auctions.
B. Charity Auctions and the Opening Bid.
If artists anticipate a change in buyers'behavior as a result of charity status, then we would expect a strategic response on their part. This is what we observe in the data. In Table 4 we present estimation results from several linear regression model speci…cations of the opening bid, which is set by the artist, as a function of charity status and other characteristics speci…c to the artwork being auctioned. All models have been estimated using a …xed e¤ects strategy to control for artist-, medium-, and ground-speci…c e¤ects. with respect to standard auctions in September, but increases by $0.73 in October; neither e¤ect is statistically signi…cant.
In models 3 and 4 we analyze the impact of di¤erent levels of charity giving in OC on the opening bid. Focusing our attention on the linear model, we observe that, other things the same, the tendency is for the opening bid of OC to be higher than that of standard auctions.
However, a 10% increase in the proportion of revenues that go into charity results in a $2.7 decrease in the opening bid, and this e¤ect is statistically signi…cant.
C. Charity Auctions and the Second Highest Bid.
As indicated in section three, the …nal auction price is the result of a combination of sellers and buyers' choices. However, we can measure the impact of an auction's charity status on buyers' willingness to pay by concentrating our attention in the second highest bid. As illustrated in equation (1) the second highest bid is only observed in auctions with two or more bidders. Otherwise, the opening bid represents an upper bound to the second highest bid for auctions with a single bidder or with no bidders. Thus, it is appropriate in this framework to employ censored regression techniques to analyze the impact of charity status on the willingness to pay of the second highest bidder. Consistent with equation (2), consider a log-linear speci…cation for the second highest bid, ln v N 1;ij = 0 + j + X ij + " ij , where the second highest bid, v N 1;ij ; is observed when v N 1;ij s 0;it ; with s 0;ij representing the opening bid. Thus consider y it = ln v N 1;ij and c it = ln s 0;it : We observe M ax (y it ; c it ) ;
or after a transformation, y it = y it c it = 0 + j c it + X ij + " ij ; the equivalent expression M ax (y it ; 0) : We estimate this …xed e¤ects censored regression model using semiparametric estimation techniques developed in Honore (1992) and surveyed in Arellano and Honore (2005); a detailed description of the approach can be found in these references. Also, we use the bootstrap method with 100 repetitions to generate t-values.
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Estimation results are presented in Table 5 . We consider the same model speci…cations as in previous tables. Size is an important determinant of value across model speci…cations.
A one square foot increase in size is associated with a 16.5% to 16.7% average statistically signi…cant increase in the second highest bid, which is consistent across model speci…cation.
In addition, from Model 1 we observe that AA status increases the second highest bid by 78%, while OC status increases the second highest bid by 27%, on average. However, these aggregated measures conceal important di¤erences in bidders willingness to pay over time.
In model 2 we attempt to understand the importance of the timing of placement of the auction by interacting charity status with month dummies according to the ending date of the auction. AA status increases the second highest bid by 103% with respect to comparable standard auctions in September, by 74% in October and by 45% and 35% in November and December, respectively. Similarly, OC status increases the second highest bid by 69% with respect to comparable standard auctions in September, but decreases it by 20% in October -this last value is not statistically signi…cant.
In models 3 and 4 we analyze the impact of di¤erent levels of charity giving in OC on the bidders'willingness to pay. Focusing our attention on the linear model, we observe that a 10% increase in the proportion of the pro…ts that go to charity results in an 8% increase in the second highest bid.
Conclusions.
Our results show that AA auctions attract a larger number of bidders and have a much higher probability of sale than OC auctions and standard non-charity auctions. AA status is associated with a 45% increase in the probability of sale with respect to standard auctions;
there are not signi…cant di¤erences in the probability of sale between OC and standard auctions. Our results also indicate that AA status increases the second highest bid by 78%, while OC status increases the second highest bid by 27%, on average. AA auctions are associated with a much lower opening bid than OC and standard auctions.
These aggregated measures conceal important di¤erences in bidders'arrival and willingness to pay as a function of the auction's ending date. For auctions ending in September 2001, AA status increases the probability of sale by 55% with respect to standard auctions in September, and this percentage decreases to 16% by November and December. For OC status, the sale probability increases by 35% with respect to standard auctions in September, but decreases by 37% with respect to standard auctions in October. Similar e¤ects are also observed on the number of bidders. Furthermore, the opening bid for charity auctions increases as competition between bidders in these auctions decreases. This suggests that, when faced with soft competition artists increase the opening bid as a means to collect revenues from bidders; the philanthropic motive may also play a role.
For auctions ending in September 2001, AA status is associated with an increase in the second highest bid of 103% with respect to comparable standard auctions, an increase of 74% in October and 45% and 35% in November and December, respectively. OC status is associated with an increase in the second highest bid of 69% with respect to comparable standard auctions in September, but a 20% decrease in October (this last value is not statistically signi…cant). For OC auctions, the proportion of pro…ts that are assigned to charity also plays an important role in the outcome of the auction. In particular, a 10% increase in the proceeds going to charity is associated with a 2.2% increase in sale probability and an 8% increase in the second highest bid.
A …nding that may be relevant for philanthropic organizations is the substantial change in the level of revenues collected at di¤erent dates. This suggests that when there is competition for donations among di¤erent charity organizations it pays to act more aggressively early on.
This …nding is consistent with the canonical economic model of private giving to public goods (Andreoni, 2006) in which an individual's incentive to give to charity is reduced as donations from others increase. Also, it seems quite clear than the introduction of AA auctions leads to the end of OC auctions, in part due to a signi…cant change in buyers'willingness to pay for OC status. Thus, buyers seem to place a high valued on the simplicity and trustworthiness of the Auction for America program.
The results in this paper also suggest future avenues for theoretical, experimental and …eld research on the area of charity auctions, as they show that when modeling charity auctions it is important to take into account how certain choices of the seller (e.g., opening bid, percentage of proceeds for charity, timing of the auction) and the buyer (e.g., auction
participation, willingness to pay) are a¤ected by the auction's charity status, and how these choices impact auction outcomes, revenues in particular. The dependent variable is Log(#bidders + 1). Date dummies include month and year dummies. Fixed effects include control for artist specific effects, medium and ground. Date dummies include month and year dummies. eBay feedback has been standardized. Fixed effects include control for artist specific effects, medium, ground. Date dummies include month and year dummies. Fixed effects include control for artist specific effects, medium and ground. Date dummies include month and year dummies. Fixed effects include control for artist specific effects, medium and ground. T-values computed using 100 bootstrap repetitions.
